Brief of the Intellectual Property Amicus Brief Clinic of the University of New Hampshire School of Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party by Richey, Susan M. et al.
University of New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Law Faculty Scholarship University of New Hampshire – School of Law
12-8-2011
Brief of the Intellectual Property Amicus Brief
Clinic of the University of New Hampshire School
of Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party
Susan M. Richey
University of New Hampshire School of Law
John M. Greabe
University of New Hampshire School of Law, john.greabe@law.unh.edu
Keith M. Harrison
University of New Hampshire School of Law
J. Jeffrey Hawley
University of New Hampshire School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/law_facpub
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Intellectual Property Amicus Brief Clinic of the University of New Hampshire School of Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL 6179421.
No. 11-210 
Jn 'Qtbt 






On Writ Of Certiorari To The 
United States Court Of Appeals 
For The Ninth Circuit 
BRIEF OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AMICUS BRIEF CLINIC OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW HAMPSHIRE SCHOOL OF LAW AS AMICUS 
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY 
Of Counsel: 
SUSAN M. RICHEY 
Professor of Law 
UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
2 White Street 
Concord, NH 03301 
(603) 228-1541 
JOHN M. GREABE 
Counsel of Record 
Professor of Law 
UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
2 White Street 
Concord, NH 03301 
(603) 513-1191 
John.Greabe@law.unh.edu 
[Additional Counsel Listed On Inside Cover] 
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. 1800) 225-6964 
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 
KEITH M. HARRISON 
Professor of Law 
UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
2 White Street 
Concord, NH 03301 
J. JEFFREY HAWLEY 
Director, Amicus Brief Clinic 
Professor of Law 
UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
2 White Street 
Concord, NH 03301 
1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES................................. 11 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE...................... 1 
INTRODUCTION................................................ 1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT...................... 3 
ARGUMENT........................................................ 5 
I. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) Bans False Statements 
of Association or Affiliation . . . . . . . . .... .. .. ... . .. . 5 
II. Trademark Law Regulates False State-
ments of Association or Affiliation . . . ... ...... 7 
III. The Phrase "Congressional Medal of Honor" 
Performs a Trademark Function............... 9 
A. "Congressional Medal of Honor" Dis-
tinguishes Recipients of the Nation's 
Highest Military Honor From Non-
Recipients ............................................ 9 
. 
B. Recipients of the Medal Compose a 
Collective Organization, the Congres-
sional Medal of Honor Society............. 10 
C. The Phrase "Congressional Medal of 
Honor" Functions as a Collective Mem-
bership Mark....................................... 12 
IV. The First Amendment Permits Congress 
to Prohibit Infringement of the "Congres-
sional Medal of Honor" Collective Mem-
bership Mark............................................. 14 
CONCLUSION..................................................... 17 
11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. FirstHealth of the 
Carolinas, Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492 (T.T.A.B. 
Page 
2005) ............................................................ ~ ............. 8 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 
557 (1980) .......................................................... 16, 17 
Ex Parte The Supreme Shrine of the Order of 
the White Shrine of Jerusalem, 109 U.S.P.Q. 
248 (Comm'r. Pat. 1956) ......................................... 13 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) ......... 2 
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 
403 (1916) .................................................................. 7 
In re Stencil Aero Engineering Corp., 170 
U.S.P.Q. 292 (T.T.A.B. 1971) ............................. 12, 13 
McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877) ....................... 8 
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United 
States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 
(1987) ................................................... 3, 4, 15, 16, 17 
The National Board of the Young Women's 
Christian Association of the U.S.A. v. Young 
Women's Christian Association of Charleston, 
South Carolina, 335 F.Supp. 615 (D.C.S.C. 
1971) ............................................................ : ........... 14 
United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 
2010) .......................................................................... 2 
United States v. Alvarez, No. 07-0135(A)-ER 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued 
Page 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) ..... 16, 17 
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) ......... 2 
Zimmerman v. National Association of Realtors, 
70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (T.T.A.B. 2004) ........................ 13 
STATUTES 
10 U.S.C. § 3741 (1999) ................................................ 9 
. 
10 U.S.C. § 6241 (1999) ................................................ 9 
10 u.s.c. § 8741 (1998) ................................................ 9 
14 u.s.c. § 491 (1996) .................................................. 9 
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006) ................................................ 7 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(A) (2006) ................................... 7 
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) ................................................ 7 
18 u.s.c. § 704 ....................................................... 5, 12 
18 U.S.C. § 704(b) ............................................... passim 
18 U.S.C. § 704(c) ......................................................... 5 
18 U.S.C. § 704(c)(2) (1996 & Supp. 2011) ................... 9 
18 u.s.c. § 704(d) ....................................................... 13 
18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2000 & Supp. 2011) ......................... 8 
18 U.S.C. § 2320(e)(l)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2011) ..... 14, 16 
36 U.S.C. § 40502(2) (1999) ........................................ 11 
36 u.s.c. § 40502(3) (1999) ........................................ 11 
36 U.S.C. § 40503(a) (1999 & Supp. 2011) ................. 11 
IV 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued 
Page 
36 u.s.c. § 40505-06 (1999) ....................................... 11 
36 U.S.C. § 130303 (1999) .......................................... 13 
36 U.S.C. § 140503 (1999 & Supp. 2011) ....... : ........... 13 
36 U.S.C. § 220506(a) (1999) ...................................... 14 
152 CONG. REC. H8820 (2006) .................................... 10 
152 CONG. REC. H8821 (2006) ...................................... 6 
H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. Rep. No. 2322, 
at 11 (1958) .............................................................. 11 
Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting 
Legislation, 130 CONG. REC. 31,675 (1984) .............. 8 
Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, 
§ 2(1), (3), 120 Stat. 3266, 3266 (2006) ....... 5, 6, 7, 10 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION§ 23:19 (4th ed. 2011) ............. 8 
Alvarez to Face More Charges, SAN GABRIEL 
v ALLEY TRIBUNE, Jan. 13, 2008 ................................. 6 
CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR FOUNDATION, 
http://www.cmohfoundation.org (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2011) ............................................................ 11 
CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR SOCIETY, http:// 
www.cmohs.org (last visited Dec. 2, 2011) ............. 11 
1 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
The University of New Hampshire School of Law 
(UNH Law, formerly Franklin Pierce Law Center) 
has a long history of intellectual property expertise. 
UNH Law has an established Intellectual Property 
Amicus Brief Clinic that has filed amicus briefs for 
this Court as well as lower courts. With faculty 
guidance and student participation, the Clinic seeks 
to file amicus briefs that will lead to the development 
and predictable application of intellectual property 
law to promote innovation and fair competition. The 
Clinic submits briefs for selected cases with the hope 
of contributing important perspectives that might not 
be adequately represented by the parties. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case has been litigated on the assump-
tion that the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) 
whether as a facial matter or as applied to the false 
statement of fact that respondent Xavier Alvarez 
admits to having made, turns on whether the state-
ment falls within a "categor[y] of speech . . . fully 
1 Counsel for each party has provided the Intellectual 
Property Amicus Brief Clinic of the University of New Hamp-
shire School of Law with written consent to the filing of this 
amicus brief. No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole 
or in part, and no person other than amicus curiae, its members 
or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or 
submission. 
2 
outside the protection of the First Amendment." 
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010); 
see also id. at 1584 (stating that the categories of 
speech that may be restricted on the basis of content 
without regard to First Amendment protections "in-
clud[e] obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and 
speech integral to criminal conduct") (citations omit-
ted). A di~ded panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit determined that Alvarez's state-
ment did not fall within such a category after analy-
sis of whether the statement could be regarded as 
defamatory; fraudulent, or integral to criminal con-
duct. See generally United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 
1198 (9th Cir. 2010). Concluding that it could not be 
so regarded, the panel applied the strict scrutiny test 
applicable to ordinary content-based speech restric-
tions and held the statute facially unconstitutional. 
Id. at 1215-18. Dissenting, Judge Bybee voted to up-
hold the statute, both facially and as applied, on the 
ground that false statements of fact such as those 
proscribed by§ 704(b) constitute a category of speech 
that falls outside of the First Amendment's protection 
"except in a limited set of contexts where such protec-
tion is necessary 'to protect speech that matters.'" Id. 
at 1218-19 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (quoting Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974)). 
The undersigned do not address the issues that 
divided the Ninth Circuit panel. Rather, the under-
signed call to the Court's attention an alternative, 
narrower line of analysis that bears on the constitu-
tional validity of applying § 704(b) to those, such as 
-----------------·---------
3· 
Alvarez, who falsely claim to have received the Con-
gressional Medal of Honor. The undersigned submit 
this brief solely to assist the Court in making a fully 
informed assessment of the question presented; they 
recognize that the government did not defend the 
statute on the narrow basis advanced, and they take 
no position on the proper disposition of this particular 
case. 
. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Prohibiting false association or affiliation is an 
objective of trademark law, which imposes civil and 
criminal penalties on those who infringe valid trade-
marks. The phrase "Congressional Medal of Honor" 
may plausibly be understood to perform a trademark 
function by distinguishing recipients of the nation's 
highest military honor - those who compose the 
federally-chartered collective organization known as 
the Congressional Medal of Honor Society - from 
non-recipients. Accordingly, the phrase "Congressional 
Medal of Honor" may function as a valid collective 
membership mark, the infringement of which may 
constitutionally be regulated by measures that satisfy 
the variants of intermediate First Amendment scru-
tiny employed in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. 
v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 
535-41 (1987) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge 
to a federal statute authorizing the United States 
Olympic Committee to prohibit certain commercial 
4 
and promotional uses -0f the Committee's trademarks, 
including the word "Olympic"). 
If§ 704(b) were construed to be a measure regu-
lating, inter alia, the infringement of the "Congres-
sional Medal of Honor" collective membership mark, 
the constitutionality of its application to those who 
falsely claim to have been awarded the Medal could 
be assessed under the analysis prescribed in San 
Francisco Arts & Athletics.2 Under that analysis, the 
First Amendment permits the prohibition of falsely 
claiming to have been awarded the Medal. Taking 
such a narrow decisional tack would obviate any need 
to answer the broad and ramified question of whether 
false statements of fact are categorically beyond the 
reach of the First Amendment except in circumstanc-
es where they are necessary to protect speech that 
matters. In any event, in deciding the question_ pre-
sented, the Court should be aware of the potential 
applicability of trademark law and consider the 
potential effects of its ruling on such law. 
2 The undersigned recognize that the parties dispute 
whether 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) contains a scienter requirement, and 
that additional constitutional questions could arise if the statute 
were read not to contain such a requirement. The undersigned 
do not take a position on this dispute; instead, they confine 
their argument to how the constitutionality of§ 704(b) should 
be assessed for First Amendment purposes if the statute were 
treated as a measure prohibiting, inter alia, infringement of the 






I. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) Bans False Statements 
of Association or Affiliation 
On May 5, 2008, Xavier Alvarez pled guilty to 
one count of falsely claiming to have received the 
Congressional Medal of Honor, the nation's highest 
military honor. The charge arose out of a public 
statement that he made almost a year earlier, when, 
introducing himself as a newly-elected member of the 
local water board in Pomona, California,. he claimed 
to be a Medal recipient. In truth, Alvarez is not a 
recipient of the Medal and has never served in the 
U.S. Armed Forces. Alvarez's oral claim to be one of 
an elite group of combat heroes creates exactly the 
sort of false association that Congress sought to 
curtail in the 2006 amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 704, 
known as the Stolen Valor Act, codified in pertinent 
part at 18 U.S.C. §§ 704(b)-(c).3 Until the 2006 amend-
ment, § 704 prohibited falsely identifying oneself with 
Medal recipients but only insofar as such conduct 
took the form of wearing or displaying an actual 
Medal or colorable imitation of the Medal. Supporters 
of the amendment sought to extend the reach of the 
criminal statute to encompass knowing false verbal or 
written representations about one's receipt of the 
3 Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 2(1), (3), 
120 Stat. 3266, 3266 (2006). The Act covers false claims with 
regard to other military medals and decorations in addition to 
the Congressional Medal of Honor. 
6 
Medal, in order to close a perceived gap in the statu-
tory scheme. 4 
Prior to passage of the Act, Congress estimated 
that over 250 imposters existed who were beyond the 
reach of the law because their false claims of receiv-
ing the Medal were purely oral or written in nature. 5 
In fact, an additional count against Alvarez charged 
him with making the same false oral representation 
in a meeting with the Pomona Police Officer's Asso-
ciation in November 2005 when he was seeking the 
group's endorsement of his candidacy for mayor of 
Pomona.6 The second count was dismissed, however, 
4 One of the authors of the legislation, U.S. Representative 
John Salazar, offered the following observations about the pro-
posed amendment: 
Current law basically allows Federal law enforce-
ment to prosecute individuals who physically wear 
medals on their person. The problem has been occur-
ring where individuals are claiming to have earned 
these medals and there is no way for authorities to 
be able to prosecute these individuals. These frauds 
and these phonies have diminished the meaning and 
the honor of the recognitions received by our military 
heroes. 
In addition to diminishing the meaning, on 
several occasions phonies have used their stature as a 
decorated war hero to gain credibility that allows 
them to commit more serious frauds. 
152 CONG. REC. H8821 (2006) (statement of Rep. Salazar). 
5 Id. at 8820. 
6 See Afvarez to Face More Charges, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY 
TRIBUNE, Jan. 13, 2008; First Superseding Information, United 







apparently because Alvarez's November 2005 state-
ment was made before the amendment's 2006 effec-
tive date. 7 Passage of the Act put false claimants such 
as Alvarez within the reach of federal prosecutors. 
II. Trademark Law Regulates False State-
ments of Association or Affiliation 
Generally, a trademark functions to distinguish 
the goods or services of one commercial entity from 
those of another. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. 
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) (pre-Lanham Act 
decision).8 Judicial enforcement of trademark rights 
serves a dual purpose, i.e., protection of consumers 
from deception in the marketplace and protection of 
the business goodwill engendered by a merchant's use 
of a particular mark to sell his goods or advertise his 
services. See id. at 412-13. The federal Lanham Act 
protects unregistered and federally-registered marks 
from infringement which occurs when one party uses 
a commercial designation in such a way as to create a 
likelihood of confusion with regard to its association 
or affiliation with another or with regard to the origin 
of their respective goods or services.9 Likelihood of 
7 Judgment and Commitment, United States v. Alvarez, No. 
07-0135(A)-ER (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2008). 
8 See also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (Lanham Act definition of 
"mark"). 
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006) (providing a cause of action for 
infringement offederally-registered marks); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(A) 
(2006) (providing a cause of action for infringement of unregistered 
(Continued on following page) 
8 
confusion is assessed in relation to "ordinary pur-
chasers, buying with ordinary caution," McLean v. 
Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1877), unless the mark in 
issue is a collective membership mark, a type of mark 
that designates only membership in a specific group 
and does not involve purchasers of goods or services, 
Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. FirstHealth of the Caro-
linas, Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492, 1512 (T.T.A.B. 2005). 
In the latter case, likelihood of confusion is measured 
by reference to "relevant persons," i.e., "those persons 
or groups of persons for whose benefit the member-
ship mark is displayed." See id. at 1513. The Lanham 
Act provides civil remedies for trademark infringe-
ment but criminal penalties for the most egregious 
form of infringement are also available at the federal 
level. 10 
marks and unfair competition). Courts analyze likelihood of 
confusion by examining and balancing a variety of factors 
including, inter alia, the strength of the plaintiff's mark, the 
similarity of the parties' marks and their respective goods and 
services, evidence of actual confusion in the marketplace, and 
the defendant's intent. See generally 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION§ 23:19 (4th ed. 2011). 
10 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2000 & Supp. 2011). See Joint State-
ment on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 CONG. REC. 
31,675 (1984) ("[A] counterfeit mark is the most egregious 
example of a mark that is 'likely to cause confusion.'"). 
t· 
9 
III. The Phrase "Congressional Medal of Hon-
or" Performs a Trademark Function 
A. "Congressional Medal of Honor'' Distin-
guishes Recipients of the Nation's High-
est Military Honor From Non-Recipients 
Congress uses the phrase "Congressional Medal 
of Honor" to designate members of the U.S. armed ser-
vices who, having distinguished themselves through 
conspicuous gallantry and disregard for personal 
safety while engaged in conflict on behalf of the 
nation's military, receive the nation's high~st military 
award. The actual title of the honor, awarded by the 
President in the name of Congress, is "Medal of 
Honor"; the award is made under separate statutory 
authorization to members of each branch of the armed 
services.11 Section 704(c)(2) of Title 18 utilizes the 
phrase, "Congressional Medal of Honor," as a com-
posite reference to refer to the Medal as awarded to 
members of all branches of the armed services, or to 
duplicates or replacements of the Medal. 12 In the leg-
islative history of the Stolen Valor Act, Congress 
acknowledged that Congressional Medal of Honor 
impersonators are motivated by a desire to identify 
themselves with the heroic characteristics of actual re-
cipients but explicitly recognized the damaging nature 
11 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3741, 6241 (1999) (Army, naval services); 
10 U.S.C. §§ 8741 (1998) (Air Force); 14 U.S.C. § 491 (1996) 
(Coast Guard). 
12 18 U.S.C. § 704(c)(2) (1996 & Supp. 2011). 
10 
of such conduct. 13 Whether done to perpetrate fraudu-
lent activity or simply to aggrandize oneself in the 
eyes of others, false identification with this distin-
guished group "denigrates" and "dishonors" the collec-
tive members of the group; Congress sought to return 
to Medal recipients "the dignity and respect taken by 
those who have stolen it" by enacting.the Stolen Valor 
Act.14 
B. Recipients of the Medal Compose a Col-
lective Organization, the Congressional 
Medal of Honor Society 
The Congressional Medal of Honor Society was 
organized in 1948 by a group of recipients of the 
Medal 
for the purpose of providing a common 
ground on which all recipients of the Con-
gressional Medal of Honor may meet to pre-
serve the dignity of the Nation's highest 
award; to protect the medal and the holders 
thereof from exploitation or other improper 
action; to provide assistance as may be 
needed by holders of the medal and their de-
pendents; to bring- the medal to the attention 
of the public wherever possible to inspire the 
youth of the Nation; and to serve our country 
13 152 CONG REC. H8820 (2006). 








in all proper ways in peace as its holders did 
in time of war.15 
In 1958, the Society became a Title 36 congressionally-
chartered corporation and its purposes are recited in 
the statutory charter, including, inter alia, "to protect 
the name of the medal ... from exploitation"16 and "to 
protect, uphold, and preserve the dignity" of the 
Medal at all times. 17 Membership in the Society is 
restricted to recipients of the Medal and no honorary 
memberships are allowed.18 The Society possesses the 
usual corporate powers, but the Society, i'ts directors 
and officers, are restricted by statute from partici-
pating in any political activity. 19 Today, the Society 
provides a platform for its members to engage in 
educational outreach, fundraising for scholarships, 
and a variety of other initiatives in furtherance of the 
Society's purposes. 20 
15 H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. Rep. No. 2322, at 11 
(1958). 
16 36 U.S.C. § 40502(3) (1999) (emphasis added). 
17 Id. § 40502(2). 
18 Id. § 40503(a). 
19 Id. §§ 40505-06. 
20 See CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR SOCIETY, http://www. 
cmohs.org (last visited Dec. 2, 2011). The Society's activities in 
this regard are aided and supported by the Congressional Medal 
of Honor Foundation, a charitable· corporation founded by the 
Society. See CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR FOUNDATION, http:// 
www.cmohfoundation.org (last visited Dec. 2, 2011). 
12 
C. The Phrase "Congressional Medal of 
Honor" Functions as a Collective Mem-
bership Mark 
The federal government has reserved use of the 
phrase, "Congressional Medal of Honor," as an identi-
fier for recipients of the Medal so that they may 
designate their status as recipients and as members 
of the Society. Under the federal Lanham Act, govern-
mental entities may own, register, and enforce trade-
marks, including collective membership marks.21 The 
owner of a collective membership mark need not be a 
collective organization itself but may form a collective 
for the benefit of specific individuals, just as the 
federal government has done in chartering the Society 
for the benefit of Medal recipients.22 See In re Stencil 
21 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2006) (Lanham Act authorization for 
"nations, States, municipalities, and the like" to register collec-
tive marks). Examples of federally-registered collective member-
ship marks belonging to a department or agency of the U.S. 
government include: "SEAL," U.S. Reg. No. 3,285,473, indicating 
membership in an organization that develops and executes 
military missions involving special operations strategy, doctrine, 
and tactics, registered by the Department of the Navy; "MEDI-
CAL RESERVE CORPS" and Design, U.S. Reg. No. 3,007,633, 
indicating membership in a group of service-providers who have 
an established group of practicing and retired physicians, 
nurses, and other health professionals to act' in a coordinated 
manner in times of local emergencies, registered by the Office of 
the Surgeon General; "AIRBORNE A A" and design, U.S. Reg. 
No. 2,487,176, indicating membership in the U.S. Army 82nd 
Airborne Division, registered by the Department of the Army. 
22 Congress has chartered other collective organizations for 
the benefit of recipients and their family members of other mili-
tary medals referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 704, specifically medals 




Aero Engineering Corp., 170 U.S.P.Q. 292, 293 (T.T.A.B. 
1971). The owner need only exercise legitimate con-
trol over the group and its members' use of the mark. 
Id. at 293. Congress asserts control over the Society's 
use of the phrase "Congressional Medal of Honor" by 
chartering the Society for purposes that include guard-
ing against exploitation of the name of the Medal and 
protecting and preserving the reputation of the Medal. 
Further, Congress controls use of the phrase for self-
identification purposes by restricting membership in 
the collective to actual Medal recipients. 
Collective membership marks differ from tradi-
tional trademarks in that they do not indicate the 
commercial origin of goods or services; they serve 
solely to indicate membership in a group, such as a 
fraternal society, a cooperative, or a trade union. See 
Zimmerman v. National Association of Realtors, 70 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1425, 1428 n.6 (T.T.A.B. 2004) (citing 
Ex Parte The Supreme Shrine of the Order of the 
White Shrine of Jerusalem, 109 U.S.P.Q. 248, 249-50 
(Comm'r. Pat. 1956)). In this case, the phrase "Con- -
gressional Medal of Honor" operates as a collective 
referenced in § 704(d) for which misrepresentation results in 
enhanced penalties. The Legion of Valor of the United States of 
America, Inc., is authorized to extend membership to the 
recipients, their parents and lineal descendants, of the Distin-
guished Service Cross, the Navy Cross, the Air Force Cross, and 
the Medal of Honor. 36 U.S.C. § 130303 (1999). Similarly, the 
Military Order of the Purple Heart of the United States of 
America, Inc., may extend membership to the recipients of the 
Purple Heart Medal and their immediate families. 36 U.S.C. 
§ 140503 (1999 & Supp. 2011). 
14 
membership mark by designating the only individu-
als eligible to be members of the Congressional Medal 
of Honor Society. Al.though collective membership 
marks may be federally registered, they need not be 
in order to be enforceable. See The National Board of 
the Young Women's Christian Association of the U.S.A. 
v. Young Women's Christian Association of Charleston, 
South Carolina, 335 F.Supp. 615, 623 (D.C.S.C. 1971). 
Section 704(b) of Title 18 provides a mechanism for 
enforcing rights in the phrase "Congressional Medal 
of Honor" against false association or affiliation with-
out any requirement that the phrase be federally 
· registered. 23 
IV. The First Amendment Permits Congress 
to Prohibit Infringement of the "Congres-
sional Medal of Honor" Collective Mem-
bership Mark 
If the Court were to accept the argument that 
§ 704(b) functions as a trademark statute prohibiting 
infringement of the "Congressional Medal of Honor" 
collective membership mark, it would not need to 
decide the broad and ramified question of whether 
23 Congress has authorized criminal penalties for counter-
feiting of the unregistered marks of another congressionally 
chartered organization, the U.S. Olympic Committee. See 18 
U.S.C. § 2320(e)(l)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2011) (unauthorized use 
of marks identical to or substantially indistinguishable from 
trademarks listed in 36 U.S.C. § 220506(a) (1999), including the 
word "Olympic," constitutes criminal counterfeiting without 
requiring proof of federal registration). 
15 
false statements of fact are categorically beyond the 
reach of the First Amendment except when necessary 
to protect speech that matters. Rather, the Court 
could uphold the constitutionality of the statute's 
application to those, such as Alvarez, who falsely 
claim to have been awarded the Congressional Medal 
of Honor under the First Amendment analysis pre-
scribed in San Franc;isco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. 
United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 535-
41 (1987).24 
San Francisco Arts & Athletics involved a First 
Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of a 
federal statute that granted the United States Olym-
pic Committee (USOC) the right to prohibit certain 
commercial and promotional uses of the word "Olym-
pic." See id. at 532-41. Exercising that right, the 
USOC obtained an injunction prohibiting the peti-
tioner from promoting an athletic event under the 
name "Gay Olympic Games." Id. at 525-27. Petitioner 
challenged the injunction before this Court, arguing 
in relevant part that the statute violated the First 
Amendment by authorizing the USOC to prohibit use 
of the word "Olympic" without showing that such use 
was likely to confuse the public. 25 Id. at 532. 
24 The undersigned reiterate that their argument addresses 
only the First Amendment implications of 18 U.S.C. § 704(b). 
See supra note 2. 
25 Like its civil counterpart, the criminal statute prohibiting 
counterfeiting of the U.S. Olympic Committee's trademarks does 
(Continued on following page) 
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In assessing petitioner's argument, the Court con-
cluded that the constitutionality of the infringement 
on petitioner's commercial and promotional speech 
rights worked by the statute should be assessed 
under variants of intermediate First Amendment 
scrutiny. See id. at 535-41. Insofar as petitioner was 
precluded from engaging in commercial speech, the 
Court applied the test authorized in Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (a restriction on 
non-misleading commercial speech is valid if the 
government's interest in the restriction is substantial, 
if the restriction directly advances the government's 
asserted interest, and if it is no more extensive than 
necessary to serve the interest). See San Francisco 
Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 537 n.16. Insofar as 
petitioner was precluded from engaging in non-
commercial speech, the Court applied the balancing 
test applicable to measures that incidentally restrict 
speech while seeking to further substantial non-speech 
purposes prescribed in United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367, 377 (1968). San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 
483 U.S. at 537 n.16. Explaining that the application 
of these two balancing tests to the facts of the case 
was "substantially similar," id., the Court concluded 
that the challenged statute passed constitutional 
muster. See id. at 537-41. 
not require proof of a likelihood of confusion. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2320(e)(l)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2011). 
17 
If the Court were to read§ 704(b) as a trademark 
infringement statute similar to the statute upheld 
against a First Amendment challenge in San Francis-
co Arts & Athletics, and if the Court were to follow the 
lines of reasoning adopted and applied in that case, it 
could uphold against a First Amendment challenge 
the statute's prohibition on falsely claiming to have 
been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. 
Insofar as the statute prohibits one from falsely 
making such a claim in the course of commercial self-
promotion, the infringement would constitl:lte a lawful 
restriction on false or misleading commercial speech. 
See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Insofar as the 
statute prohibits one from making such a claim in a 
non-commercial context, certainly the incidental 
restriction on one's ability to tell this particular lie 
could not possibly outweigh Congress's strong inter-
est in preserving the dignity of the Nation's highest 
military honor. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the undersigned do not take the 
position that the Court should vacate the Ninth Cir-
cuit's judgment and uphold the constitutionality of 
Alvarez's conviction under a trademark infringement 
analysis. Rather, the undersigned wish to apprise the 
Court of the potential applicability of such an analy-
sis as it considers the question presented, and, more 
generally, of their view that resolution of this case 
does not necessarily require the Court to decide 
18 
whether false statements of fact are invisible to the 
First Amendment except in circumstances where they 
are necessary to protect speech that matters. 
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